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Abstract—Smart devices capture users’ activity such as unlock
failures, application usage, location and proximity of devices in
and around its surrounding environment. This activity informa-
tion varies between users and can be used as digital fingerprints
of the users’ behaviour. Traditionally, users are authenticated to
access restricted data using long term static attributes such as
password and roles. In this paper, in order to allow secure and
seamless data access in mobile environment, we combine both
the user behaviour captured by the smart device and the static
attributes to develop a novel access control technique. Security
and performance analyse show that the proposed scheme sub-
stantially reduces the computational complexity while enhances
the security compared to the conventional schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently Google introduced a new authentication technique
called smart lock for its Android Lollipop mobile operating
system. This new feature provides seamless access to the
device without compromising the security i.e., devices are
secured from intruders but also easy to unlock when a se-
curity check has been made. This smart lock allows Android
based smart phones to bypass lock screen security when it is
connected to trusted devices via Bluetooth or NFC or located
in trusted locations1. Smart devices are now embedded with
numerous sensors and capable of capturing more sophisticated
information about the user’s day-to-day activity on top of
the trusted locations and trusted devices such as app usage,
charging pattern, temperature, lighting, etc [1], [2].
The aim of this paper is to exploit the above sensor data to
develop a novel seamless data sharing technique for mobile
devices. In general, the data sharing involves three parties
i.e., owners, (mobile) users, and storage server. Traditionally,
we assume these three are in the same domain and also that
the server is fully trusted. In the recent trend towards cloud
computing and outsourcing environments, we cannot rely on
the traditional data sharing setup since the data confidentiality
is not guaranteed within third party cloud environment. To
overcome this challenge, the data confidentiality in a cloud
environment is achieved via attribute based encryption (ABE)
technique [3], [4], [5], [6].
ABE is considered as a promising cryptographic technique
and supports both the data confidentiality and access control
simultaneously [3], [4], [5], [6]. Using ABE, the data owners
can encrypt the data using fine-grained access policies. For
instance, let us assume, an employer uploads encrypted file
1https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/6093922?hl=en-GB
to the cloud using ABE, where access policy of that file
is defined using the following attributes and functions AND
and OR: “Manager” OR “Finance Office” AND “Company
A”. Hence, an employee who is a “Manager” employed at
“Company A” can decrypt the file. The data confidentiality
in the ABE schemes relies only on predefined static attributes
such “Manager”, “Finance Office”, and “Company A”. Similar
to the smart lock feature, we note that it is also possible
to incorporate the device sensor data i.e., trusted locations,
devices etc (lets call them as dynamic attributes) within ABE
to provide seamless data sharing within mobile environment.
This feature not only improves the user experience but also
the security. Because if we consider the previous example,
where an employee has the long term credentials for the
following attributes: “Manager”, and “Company A”. Hence,
she can access the encrypted file while she is traveling in
public transport using her personnel mobile device. However,
the risk level associated in this context is high. In fact,
people in her proximity might easily see confidential data via
shoulder surfing. It is also possible for an adversary to steal the
employee’s mobile device, and get unauthorized access to the
corporate data if there is no real-time verification (assuming
that the credentials for static attributes are stored within
mobile). Hence, evaluating the data collected by smart device’s
sensors in real-time provides additional layer of security.
II. RELATED WORK
ABE was firstly proposed by Sahai and Waters in [3]. At
high level, ABE can be divided into two: single authority
and multi-authority. In a single authority scenario, there is
only one attribute authority (AA) which monitors all attributes
of users and issues encryption and decryption credentials for
the data owners and users. This single authority becomes a
fully trusted party to which the users have to prove their
attributes in order to obtain the decryption credentials. In such
a case, the AA has too much power and it can decrypt all
the data and knows about all the users’ attributes. This is
one of the limitations in single authority ABE scheme. In
order to overcome this single point-of-failure, multi-authority
ABE schemes were proposed in [7], [8]. Chase et. al. [7]
presented a MA-ABE scheme, which allows any polynomial
number of independent authorities to monitor attributes and
distribute decryption keys. However [7] requires a central
authority to monitor all other AAs; hence vulnerable for single
point of failure similar to single AA schemes. In order to fully
decentralise the MA-ABE scheme, Chase and Chow proposed
a decentralised scheme by removing the central authority [8].
However the scheme in [8] is not fully decentralised since if
an AA joins or leaves the system then the whole ABE system
needs to reboot by assigning new keys to users. Lewko and
Waters [9] proposed a fully decentralized ABE scheme, where
users could have zero or more attributes from each AA and
do not require a trusted server. In their work, the AA can join
and leave freely without re-initializing the system.
However, the above (centralised) ABE schemes do not
support user privacy i.e., users need to reveal their identities to
AAs before retrieving credentials for their attributes. In order
to overcome this limitation, a privacy-preserving MA-ABE
scheme was proposed by Han et al. in [11]. In contrast to
the existing decentralized ABE schemes, the scheme in [11]
preserves the user privacy. In [11], the Global Identifier (GID)
of the user is used to tie all the decryption keys together,
where a blind key generation protocol has been used to issue
the decryption keys. Hence, corrupted AAs cannot pool the
users’ attributes by tracing the GIDs’ of the users from the
decryption keys.
None of the above ABE schemes exploit the features of
smart phones or devices to support smart access control
framework. The work in [10] combined the centralised ABE
schemes [7], [8] and features of smart devices to enhance the
data access in the mobile environment. Since the centralised
ABE schemes do not preserve the users’ privacy, the same
privacy vulnerability exist in [10]. Since the smart devices
extract substantial amount users’ activity information, any
solution without privacy protection will endanger the adoption
of new technology. In order to overcome this issue, we propose
a new scheme in this paper which incorporates smart de-
vices’ dynamic attributes with the static attributes of privacy-
preserving decentralised ABE scheme. To achieve this, we
modify the scheme in [11] in order to appropriately incorporate
the dynamic attributes and to avoid user collusion [12]. Later
in this paper, we perform extensive numerical analysis and
security analysis to show that the proposed scheme is quicker
and secure.
A. Preliminaries
Bilinear Pairings: Let G1, G2 be two multiplicative groups
of prime order q and let g1 and g2 be generators of G1 and
G2, respectively. Let us denote a bilinear map e : G1 × G2
→ GT . The map has the following three properties:
1) Bilinearity: ∀x ∈ G1, ∀y ∈ G2, and a, b ∈ Zq, there is
eˆ(xa, yb) = eˆ(x, y)ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: For ∀x ∈ G1, ∀y ∈ G2, there is
eˆ(x, y) 6= 1.
3) Computability: eˆ is an efficient computation.
Lagrange Interpolation: Shamir’s secret share uses Lagrange
interpolation technique to obtain the secret from shared-
secrets. Suppose that p(x) ∈ Zp[x] is a (k−1) degree polyno-
mial and secret s = p(0). Let us denote S = {x1, x2, . . . , xk}
and the Lagrange coefficient for xi in S as
∆xi,S(x) =
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
x− xj
xi − xj
.
For a given k different number of values p(x1), p(x2), . . .,
p(xk), the polynomial p(x) can be reconstructed as follows,
p(x) =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
x− xj
xi − xj
=
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)∆xi,S(x),
hence the secret s can be obtained as:
s = p(0) =
∑
xi ∈ S
p(xi)
∏
xj ∈ S, xj 6=xi
0− xj
xi − xj
.
Mapping: We consider a linear comparison function namely
mapping denoted as M . This function takes two inputs: one
from smart device sensors (i.e., location) and the second one
from the data owner. Data owner must embed the required
sensor data and boolean operations. The output of the mapping
function is “yes” or “no” by comparing both the inputs. For
example, this function can extract data from smart device’s
GPS module and compare with locations in the data owner’s
input and output “yes” or “no” i.e.,M(“data from GPS” =
“London”) = no. It should be noted that this function can
be embedded securely within any smartphone apps which calls
required sensors at device level. Similar to the XACML policy
language, the data owner can even define a range of values for
sensor data. However the data owner needs to embed a boolean
function with the data to expedite the comparison process.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. System Architecture
The proposed system consists of the following four compo-
nents: mobile users (or employees), data owner (or organiza-
tions), cloud service provider, and AAs.
Mobile Users are equipped with one or more smart devices.
Data Owners upload the encrypted data to the cloud storage
and define access policies. In our scheme, the data owner
defines access policies based on static attributes obtained from
AA together with dynamic attributes. Thus, the data owner can
decide who is able to decrypt the data from where and in what
circumstances.
Cloud Service Providers provide cloud storage and com-
putational power to both the users and data owners. In our
scheme, we assume that data owner will upload the encrypted
data to the storage while the user will download the encrypted
data from the storage.
Attribute Authorities manage and maintain static attributes
of the users. Different authorities manage different sets of
attributes. A user needs to prove her attributes to the authorities
in order to receive the decryption key for each attribute from
corresponding authority. In the proposed scheme, it should be
noted that for the dynamic attributes, there is no need to have
an AA to distribute encryption and decryption credentials e.g.,
for location attribute the device uses GPS module to obtain
longitude and latitude.
B. Decentralized Attribute Based Encryption
In this section, we present a variant of the decentralized
KP-ABE scheme [11]. In a decentralized scheme, it is not
necessary to maintain a fixed number of AAs. Any AA can
join and/or leave the system at any time without rebooting the
system. First of all, we will explain sub-algorithms followed
by the privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE in Fig. 1.
C. Sub-algorithms
The decentralised ABE contains five sub-algorithms namely
global setup, authority setup, key issuing, encryption and
decryption. Let us briefly explain the functionalities of each
sub-algorithm.
Global Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter as
input and output system parameters. These system parameters
can be used by authorities who join the system.
Authority Setup: Each AA uses the system parameters ob-
tained from the global setup to generate public and private
keys for the attributes it maintains.
Key Issuing: User and AA interact via anonymous key issuing
protocol in order to determine a set of attributes which belongs
to the user. Then AA generates decryption credentials for those
attributes and sends them to the user.
Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of attributes
maintained by AA and the data as input. Then it outputs the
ciphertext of the data.
Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the decryption
credentials received from AAs and the ciphertext as input. The
decryption will be successful if and only if the user attributes
satisfy the access structure.
Detailed description of each step involved in Fig. 1 is
provided after Fig. 2.
D. Security and Privacy Threats
There are a number of known security and privacy threats
which hinder the access control schemes. Let us provide a list
of potential attacks and relate them to the requirements of the
system.
• Identity-related threats: The main threat we need to
consider is related to the identities of the elements in-
volved in the protocol. The adversary might impersonate
as one of the entities and try to establish a connection to
a legitimate entity.
• Collusion attacks: Each AA manages a set of attributes
in our system, hence, authorities can collude with each
other to infer user attributes. This will allow the malicious
authorities to profile the user based on different sets of
attributes that the user has with the malicious authorities.
Similarly, two users can collide and get access to data
which are not accessible by the users individually.
• Dynamic attribute cheating: Smart devices capture
dynamic attributes such as unlock failures, app usage,
location and near by devices using the local sensors. It
is crucial for the data owner to ensure that the user’s
device is not modified (rooted) or tampered in order to
feed false dynamic attributes. Hence, we need to consider
a set of technologies in order to guarantee that no attribute
cheating is possible.
We explain how our new algorithm mitigates all these threats
in the security and privacy analysis section later in this paper.
IV. DYNAMIC AND STATIC ATTRIBUTE-BASED
ENCRYPTION SCHEME
A. Proposed Scheme
In contrast to the conventional ABE scheme described in
Fig. 1, we will show in this section how to efficiently incor-
porate the dynamic attributes to the conventional ABE scheme,
where the data owner can encrypt the data by not only using
the credentials obtained from the AA, but also using dynamic
attributes such as location, time, temperature, noise, light, the
presence of other devices, a particular interaction between the
user and the smartphone, or a combination of these. Similar
to the conventional ABE, the proposed algorithm is also
composed of four sub-algorithms namely setup, key issuing,
encryption, and decryption. The proposed algorithm is given
in Fig. 2.
Let us consider a system which contains N number of
AAs (i.e., we denote them as A1, . . . , AN ). The attribute
set managed by the authority Ak is denoted as A˜k =
{ak,1, . . . , ak,nk} ∀k. Each AA is also assigned a value dk
i.e., user must have at least dk number of attributes of this
authority in order to retrieve the private key associated with
this AA. Initially, for a given security parameter λ, global
setup algorithm (GS) generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2
with prime order p i.e., {G1,G2} ← GS(1
λ). The authority
setup algorithm (AS) is executed by each AA to randomly
generate public keys (PK) and the corresponding private
keys (SK). The public-private key pairs for Ak is given as
{(Yk, Zk, [Tk,1, . . . , Tk,nk ]), (αk, βk, [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ])}.
Let us denote the attribute set belonging to user u as A˜u
and the common attribute set between user u and authority k
as A˜ku i.e., A˜
k
u = A˜u
⋂
A˜k. Key generation (KG) algorithm
will be used to issue decryption keys to the user u with a set
of attributes A˜u as shown in Fig. 2.
Let us denote the set of static attributes used to en-
crypt message m as A˜m and the common attribute set be-
tween message m and the authority k as A˜km i.e., A˜m =
{A˜1m, . . . , A˜
k
m, . . . , A˜
N
m}. Denote the dynamic attribute as
AC = {aa,1, . . . , aa,n} where aa,i. Let us also denote the
index set of authorities involved in the ciphertext of message
m as Ic. The encryption algorithm (E) encrypts the message
m ∈ G2 using an attribute set A˜m. The data owner also com-
putes M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n. In order to encrypt
the message, the message owner randomly generates s and
computes ciphertext C =
[
C1, C2, C3, Ck,j , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜km
]
. If
user has decryption keys for the attributes of message m then
he can obtain the message m from the ciphertext using the
following four steps by executing the decryption algorithm
(D)as shown in Fig. 2.
The novelty in our scheme compared to the conven-
tional ABE scheme lies in the encryption and the decryp-
tion sub-algorithms in Fig. 2. For the sake of simplic-
ity, let us consider the following three dynamic attributes:
aa,1 =“location”, aa,2 =“risk level associated with her recent
app usage” and aa,3 =“unlock failures in last two days”.
Now the data owner defines AC = {aa,1 = “LONDON”,
aa,2 < “3” and aa,3 < “2” } and computes C1 =
Global Setup GS For a given security parameter λ, GS generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with prime order p as follows:
{G1,G2} ← GS(1
λ). Let e : G1 × G1 −→ G2 be a bilinear map and g, h and h1 be the generators of G1 such that ∀ x, y ∈ G1
and ∀ a, b ∈ Zp, e(x
a, yb) = e(x, y)ab. There are N number of authorities {A1, . . . , AN}: Ak monitors nk attributes i.e.
A˜k = {ak,1 . . . , ak,nk}, ∀k.
Authorities Setup AS Security parameters of Ak: SKk = {αk, βk, and [tk,1, . . . , tk,nk ]} R←−−−
Zp, ∀k. Public parameters of Ak: PKk
= {Yk = e(g, g)
αk , Zk = g
βk , and [Tk,1 = g
tk,1 , . . . , Tk,nk = g
tk,nk ]}, ∀ k. Ak specify mk as minimum number of attributes required
to satisfy the access structure ( mk ≤ nk).
Key Generation KG Collision-Resistant Hash Function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp to generate u from the user global identity. Attribute set
of user is A˜u: A˜u ∩ A˜k = A˜
k
u ∀ k. Ak generates rk,u ∈R Zp and polynomial qx for each node x (including the leaves) T. For each
node x, the degree dx of the polynomial qx is dx = kx − 1 where kx – threshold value of that node. Now, for the root node r, set
qr(0) = rk,u. For any other node x, set qx(0) = qparent(x)(index(x)). Now decryption keys for the user u are generated as follows:
D =

Dk,u = g−αkh βkrk,u+u h rk,uβk+u1 , D1k,u = h 1rk,u+u , Djk,u = h
qak,j
(0)
(βk+u)tk,j
1 , ∀ak,j ∈ A˜
k
u

.
Encryption E Attribute set for the message m is A˜m: A˜m ∩ A˜k = A˜
k
m, ∀k, i.e. A˜m = {A˜
1
m, . . . , A˜
k
m, . . . , A˜
N
m}. The data owner of
message m randomly chooses s ∈R Zp, and outputs the ciphertext as follows:
C =
[
C1 = m.
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks, C2 = g
s, C3 =
∏
k∈IC
gβksand
{
Ck,j = T
s
k,j
}
∀k∈IC ,ak,j∈A˜
j
m
]
where Ic denotes the index set of the
authorities.
Decryption D In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes X, Y and Qk as follows:[
X =
∏
k∈IC
e (C2, Dk,u) , Y = e
(
C3, D
1
k,u
)
and Sk =
∏
ak,j∈A
k
m
e
(
Ck,j , D
j
k,u
)∆
ak,j ,A˜
j
m
(0)
]
. User then decrypts the message m as
follows: m = C1X
Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
.
Fig. 1. The decentralized key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme [11].
Global Setup GS same as conventional method.
Authorities Setup AS same as conventional method.
Key Generation KG same as conventional method.
Encryption E Attribute set for the message m is A˜m:
A˜m ∩ A˜k = A˜
k
m, ∀k, i.e. A˜m = {A˜
1
m, . . . , A˜
k
m, . . . , A˜
N
m}.
Data owner chooses a set of dynamic attributes and computes
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n))
Data owner of message m randomly chooses s ∈R Zp, and
outputs the ciphertext as follows:
C1 = m.h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n)).
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks,
C2 = g
s, C3 =
∏
k∈IC
gβks and
{
Ck,j = T
s
k,j
}
∀k∈IC ,ak,j∈A˜
j
m
where Ic denotes the index set of the authorities.
Hence the date owner uploads the ciphertext
C = [C1, C2, Ck,j ] into the cloud.
Decryption D User downloads C from the cloud and checks
the required attributes to decrypt m.
In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes X, Y and Qk as
follows:
X =
∏
k∈IC
e (C2, Dk,u),
Y = e
(
C3, D
1
k,u
)
and Sk =∏
ak,j∈A
k
m
e
(
Ck,j , D
j
k,u
)∆
ak,j ,A˜
j
m
(0)
.
Now the mobile device computes
h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n)).
User can decrypt the data as follows (only
if h(M(a′a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)|| . . . ||M(a
′
a,n)) =
h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n)))
User then decrypts the message m as follows:
m = C1X
h(M(a′
a,1)||M(a
′
a,2)||...||M(a
′
a,n))Y
∏
k∈IC
Sk
.
Fig. 2. The proposed scheme.
m.h(M(aa,1)||M(aa,2)|| . . . ||M(aa,n)).
∏
k∈IC
e(g, g)αks. Let
us assume that the risk level varies between 1 to 10 where
higher risk denoted by larger value. However, different organi-
zations may define the risk level based on their own standards.
For example, if a particular document is highly classified then,
the organization sets high risk value for that document rather
than ordinary documents.
In the decryption phase the mapping function, M , which
inputs data owners dynamic attribute requirements and smart
device readings and output ′′yes′′ or ′′no′′, e.g., if the current
risk level is less than the threshold defined by the data owner
then M(aa,2 < “3”) = yes. This ensures that even if a user
has all the credentials from AA, dynamic attributes enforced
by the data owner must be satisfied before the decryption. If
h(measured value) = h(data owners predefined values)
then decryption will be successful.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the computation costs associated
with the proposed scheme in Fig. 2 against the conventional
scheme in Fig. 1. In the proposed or in the conventional
scheme, the user is involved in the computation during the
decryption step and the data owner is involved in the en-
cryption step. We can ignore the computational costs involved
in the setup and key-issuing steps since these can be done
off line. Since the computational cost for hash function is
negligible compared to pairing and exponentiation, let us
denote the computational time (in ms) for one multiplication,
one exponentiation, and one pairing as Cm, Cex, and Cp,
respectively.
For comparison, we use the benchmark time values given in
the popular pairing-based cryptography library namely jPBC
2. Table I shows the time values (in ms) for Cm, Cex, and Cp
2The Java Pairing-Based Cryptography Library (JPBC), http://tinyurl.com/
ll2p39t
Fig. 3. Complexity comparison for encryption for
three dynamic attributes.
Fig. 4. Complexity comparison for encryption for
five dynamic attributes.
Fig. 5. Complexity comparison for decryption for
three dynamic attributes.
for two different testbeds: testbed 1 uses Intel(R) Core(TM) 2
Quad CPU Q6600 with 2.40GHz and 3 GB memory running
on Ubuntu 10.04 and testbed 2 uses HTC Desire HD A9191
smart phone running on Android 2.2. Let us assume that the
data owner uses an environment similar to the testbed 1 for
the encryption while user uses a mobile device similar to the
testbed 2 for the decryption.
TABLE I
TIME COMPLEXITY MEASURES FOR TWO DIFFERENT TESTBEDS.
Testbed 1 (ms) Testbed 2 (ms)
Cp 14.6 491.2
Cex 2.8 34.1
Cm 1.8 20
Let us denote the number of static attributes used for
encryption as n per authority and the total number of dynamic
attributes used by data owner as nd. Table II shows the total
time required for encryption (by the data owner) and for
decryption (by the user) for the proposed and the conventional
ABE schemes. In order to graphically visualize the actual
difference between proposed and conventional algorithms, we
plotted the computational complexities given in Table II by
varying the number of attributes, n+ nd, in Figures 3-6.
The computational complexity is measured in terms of total
time required for the data owner and the user to encrypt
and decrypt the data, respectively. Figures 3-6 depict four
different cases (a) encryption with three dynamic attributes
and static attributes vary from 1 to 7, (b) encryption with
five dynamic attributes and static attributes vary from 1 to
5, (c) decryption with three dynamic attributes and static
attributes vary from 1 to 7, and (d) decryption with five
dynamic attributes and static attributes vary from 1 to 5. With
three and five dynamic attributes (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4),
the proposed algorithm performs 1ms and 3ms faster than
the conventional scheme, respectively for encryption. This
clearly shows that incorporating more dynamic attributes speed
up the encryption. Similarly for the decryption with three
dynamic attributes (Fig. 5), the proposed scheme performs
nearly 1500ms faster than conventional scheme and for five
dynamic attributes (Fig. 6), the proposed scheme performs
Fig. 6. Complexity comparison for decryption for five dynamic attributes.
nearly 2500ms faster than conventional schemes. This sub-
stantial reduction in decryption time enable seamless access
to the data for mobile environment.
Remarks: One of the drawbacks of the existing ABE
schemes is that the complexity increases linearly with the
number of static attributes. Since our algorithm was built
on top of the existing ABE scheme the same follows. If
the data owner wants to use AAs to issue credentials for
dynamic attributes then complexity will increase linearly since
those dynamic attributes become static attributes. However,
in our solution, as seen from Figures 3-6, any number of
dynamic attributes can be added for negligible cost. Hence
the complexity in the case of our scheme can be reduced
by reducing the number of static attributes and adding more
dynamic attributes used for encryption. For example, instead
of including ten static attributes from AAs, it is possible in our
scheme that the data owner can include five static attributes
from AAs and another five dynamic attributes. This approach
reduces the complexity by half. Yet, the proposed scheme
adds additional layer of security on top of the conventional
schemes. In a nutshell, the proposed schemes do not degrade
the performance of conventional ABE while including the
dynamic attributes to provide run-time security to the data
TABLE II
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COST FOR THE DECENTRALIZED IN FIG. 1 AND THE PROPOSED SCHEME IN FIG. 2
Decentralized ABE Scheme in Fig. 1 Proposed Scheme in Fig. 2
Encryption [(2 + n)K + 1]Cex + (2K + 1)Cm + (2K + 1)Cm [(2 + n)K + 1]Cex + (2K + 2 + nd)Cm + (2K + 2 + nd)Cm
Decryption [(n+ 1)K + 1]Cp + nKCe + [3 + (2 + n)K]Cm [(n+ 1)K + 1]Cp + nKCe + [4 + nd + (2 + n)K]Cm
owner’s data.
VI. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In Section III-D, we categorized the possible security and
privacy threats to the proposed algorithms. In this section, we
address each issue and validate that our algorithm is robust
against those security and privacy threats.
Mitigate Identity Threat As shown in Fig. 2, public-
keys associated with AAs will be published online and the
corresponding private-keys are known only to the AAs. At
the same time, according to the modulo arithmetic, it is
infeasible to compute private-keys from public-keys. During
the encryption and decryption, data owners and users use AAs.
Data owner and users can verify the public-keys using well-
known techniques such as certificates. Hence, impersonating
AA is not possible. User device might be at the possession
of an attacker where user static attribute credentials are stored
on the device. However, adversary cannot get access in to the
network without satisfying the dynamic attributes introduced
in this paper. Adversary behavior may not be similar as the
legitimate user, hence, mapping function running in the user
device increases the risk level which will eventually alert the
network to deny the service request.
Mitigate Collusion Attacks Two different types of col-
lusion attacks are possible: 1) AAs can collude with each
other and aggregate the user attributes, 2) users can pool their
decryption keys to access the data which cannot be accessed
by individual users. Since our schemes were built on top
of the conventional ABE scheme, the proposed schemes are
also collusion resistant against up to (N − 2) AAs. Hence,
let us discuss the user collusion. During the key issuing
sub-algorithms, due to the inherent anonymous key issuing
protocol, user u will obtain only Dkj = g
Rkj
1 y
xj/(skj+u)
k
where user identity u is incorporated within decryption key by
inverse exponentiation operation after adding u with random
value skj (known only to authority). From the properties of
modulo arithmetic, it is infeasible to infer xj/(skj + u) from
y
xj/(skj+u)
k . Moreover, the user identity was randomized by
skj , it is infeasible to modify u with other user’s identity.
Mitigate Dynamic Attribute Cheating The mapping func-
tion installed in the mobile device can be used to verify
whether the current user is the legitimate user of the mobile
device. However, since it is installed within user’s device,
malicious users might modify this in order to feed false
information for dynamic attributes. Recent technology devel-
opment in smart device industry already has some working
prototype for this kind of security vulnerability i.e., Samsung’s
KNOX and Blackberry’s BES 34. These software platforms
3Samsung KNOX, http://tinyurl.com/me93jcv
4BlackBerry BES12, http://tinyurl.com/ls3yxh8
are capable of securely installing apps on the users’ mobile
devices and check for integrity of the installed apps without
user interruption. Hence, modifying an app in order to feed
false information can be easily detected by the data owner
using either KNOX or BES.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a smart access control technique
which incorporates attributes generated by smart devices to se-
cure the conventional access control framework without com-
promising the mobile users’ privacy. In the proposed scheme,
the data owner incorporates smart device’s dynamic attributes
together with predefined static attributes. This approach adds
additional layer of security on top of the security available in
conventional access control framework. We showed that the
efficiencies of the proposed schemes are comparable to that
of the conventional schemes while offering better security and
flexibility for mobile computing network.
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